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Death of a 78-Year Old Woman 
(Editor's note: This official opinion of the District Attorney of 
Milwaukee County, E. Michael McCann, represents a synthesis of sound 
jurisprudence and sound medical-ethical reasoning in a difficult medical 
situation.) 
In the early morning hours of Oct. 7, 1986, a 78-year old woman patient 
was admitted to Victory Memorial Hospital in Waukegan, Illinois. At the 
hospital, she was cared for by Dr. G. A. Price. 
Dr. Price stated that the patient experienced a major heart attack, 
causing a large area of heart muscle damage. He further stated that three 
additional factors appeared which contributed to a poor prognosis for the 
patient: (I) changes in her heart rhythm; (2) fairly severe congestive heart 
failure, and (3) shock. The doctor further noted that the patient's age and 
previous heart muscle damage detracted from her prognosis. Dr. Price 
informed the patient's physician-son of this poor prognosis within the first 
48 hours of her hospitalization. 
As care continued, Dr. Price concluded that the patient's heart muscle 
was very weak and that, as her normal heart rhythm alternated into more 
rapid beating, it limited the efficiency of her heart. While the patient was 
still in the hospital, on Oct. 26, 1986, the heart rhythm problem became 
acutely serious and the patient had to be cardio-shocked back into a less 
lethal rhythm. 
Thereafter, doctors at Victory Memorial Hospital determined that it was 
advisable to transfer the patient to the cardiology service at St. Luke's 
Hospital, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in the belief that if the patient's 
condition so warranted, invasive diagnostic procedures could be instituted 
and appropriate invasive management could be undertaken at that 
hospital. No such "invasive treatment" is conducted at Victory Hospital. 
Dr. Price indicated that the patient may not have been eager to go to St. 
Luke's, but that the need to address the life-threatening heart rhythm 
problem apparently quieted her reservations and that she actively 
participated in the decision to transfer to St. Luke's. 
Her physician-son resided in Milwaukee. It was determined that Dr. 1. F. 
King would care for her at St. Luke's. 
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On Oct. 29, 1986, the patient was transferred to St. Luke's Hospital. 
Her condition appeared to improve from Oct. 29 to Nov. 4, 1986. On 
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that date , the patient had a stress test which apparently left her extremely 
exhausted. She experienced a difficult night on Nov. 4, had trouble 
breathing, experienced chest pain, and required oxygen. 
On Nov. 5, 1986, the breathing difficulty and chest pain continued . A 
lung scan was ordered because of the breathing problem. The patient's 
condition improved later in the day. 
In the morning of Nov. 6, 1986, the patient felt tired and nauseated and 
experienced chest pain. 
On Nov. 7, another severe heart rhythm acceleration (supra-ventricular 
tachycardia) occurred again, necessitating the use of cardio-shock. 
Sedation was utilized . The patient was intubated with an endotracheal 
tube (inserted through the mouth and down the windpipe) and placed on a 
respirator. The drug dopamine was used to address a low blood pressure 
problem. Dr. King requested Dr. Stuart Levy to examine the patient on a 
consult and Dr. Levy's report is attached. Another lung scan reflected 
findings "compatible with worsening congestive failure." 
Visit from Nephew 
Later on Nov. 7, the patient's 36-year old nephew visited her. The 
endotracheal tube effectively precluded speech. In commuicating with her 
nephew, the patient made gestures with her left hand to the room and the 
intensive care equipment and indicated, through pantomime, that the 
effort was unwise. The nephew observed that the endotracheal tube 
seemed to cause the patient discomfort. 
On Nov. 8, attempts were made to gradually wean the patient from the 
dopamine and the endotracheal tube linked to the respirator. The patient 
appeared to be alert and cooperating with her care. By evening, the 
dopamine was withdrawn. 
During the weekend of Nov. 8 and 9, 1986, Dr. G. Dorros, as a 
substitute for Dr. King, was in charge of the care of the patient. He visited 
her on Saturday morning and returned again on Sunday morning, Nov. 9. 
At that time, Dr. Dorros examined a nuclear medicine report of a Gated 
Heart Study which had been conducted on the patient. The study cited 
serious difficulties in the patient's heart. 
After examining this report, Dr. Dorros discussed its contents with Dr. 
King and together the physicians determined that the patient should 
receive a heart catheterization on Monday, Nov. 10. Dorros believed that 
the catheterization would provide added information assisting Dr. King to 
determine which of the following options should be pursued in treatment 
of the patient: (I) heart surgery; (2) angioplasty (insertion of a device into 
the clogged artery to open it); (3) medication regimen, or (4) do nothing 
because the patient's problems would not be susceptible to treatment other 
than basic care. 
With Dr. King's consent, Dr. Dorros, sometime between 8 a.m. and 9:30 
a.m. on Nov. 9, contacted the patient's physician-son by phone at his home. 
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Dr. Dorros advised that in his communication to the patient's son, he 
reported the results ofthe Gated Heart Study, being careful to note that the 
aneurism or possible pseudo-aneurism had not been confirmed and that 
relying on the scan alone results in a high false positive rate. Dorros further 
stated that he reported the recommendations for cardiac catheterization and 
what options might be suggested thereafter. Dorros described the general 
tone of the conversation as neutral, with Dorros doing most of the talking 
and responding to questions by the patient's son. Dorros states that there 
was no talk of the patient as being a dying person and that he offered 
encouraging words and described the patient as "potentially recoverable". 
Dorros said the son indicated his approval for the heart catheterization. 
It is rather clear that the patient's son understood and interpreted this 
communication from Dr. Dorros as being the opposite of encouraging. 
The patient's son stated he concluded from the call that the prognosis was 
quite poor, that the heart was in a disastrous condition and that the only 
hope would be heart surgery. The son believed his mother would never 
authorize cardiac catheterization or heart surgery. 
There was no question that the woman's condition was serious. Dorros 
recognized the gravity of her condition, but believed that the cardiac 
catheterization might well show her able to recover in substantial measure. 
The physician-son took a much more pessimistic view of her prospects. 
The son stated that on Sunday morning, he also learned that his mother 
had experienced severe blood pressure problems Saturday evening and 
that it had been necessary to place her back on dopamine. The son 
perceived the use of dopamine as appropriate for those cases involving 
serious blood pressure problems. The son states that he arrived at the 
hospital at about 10:30 a.m. on Nov. 9, and at such time his mother looked 
gray, her hands were cold, her pulse was very high, her blood pressure was 
low, she was again on dopamine, and she was getting maximum support 
from a respirator through the endotracheal tube inserted into her mouth 
and down her windpipe. 
It is clear from the reports of all who observed the patient that day that 
she was conscious, alert, and competent from the time that Dr. Dorros saw 
her early on Sunday morning until the time she expired after the removal 
of the endotracheal tube at or about 12:42 p.m. A substantial number of 
persons saw her on Nov. 9 and not one believed her to be in other than 
competent condition. 
The patient's son stated that shortly after he arrived at the hospital, his 
mother gestured to him that she wished the endotracheal tube taken out 
and the respirator turned off. Further, she indicated that the intensive care 
effort being made was unwise and tried to take the IV out of her right arm, 
He believed she was dying. The son stated that a nurse was present at the 
time and that he informed his mother as to what the results would be if the 
endotracheal tube was removed. Nurse Heyse was the nurse present in the 
room and his report of the communication between the mother and son at 
that time is as follows: 
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The son asked, "Do you want that tube taken out?" She nodded yes. " Do you 
know you need that to breathe?" She nodded yes . "And you know that if that tube 
is taken out , you won't be able to breathe and you' ll die?," he said. She nodded 
yes . "But you still want the tube taken out and nothing else done?," he said . She 
nodded yes. 
The son then requested the nurse to contact Dr. Dorros to secure removal 
of the tube. 
The patient's nephew arrived in the mother's hospital room after her 
son. The son advised the nephew that he, the son, had been informed that 
the study showed the heart to be in a disastrous condition with many 
defects and that the patient was dying. 
The nephew stated that when persons would come into the room, the 
patient would indicate with gestures that she wanted the endotracheal tu be 
and IV tubes removed . At one point, the nephew saw the patient pull the 
respirator tube connection loose and a nurse appeared immediately and 
reconnected it. The reconnection is confirmed by a nurse. The nephew 
stated that this happened a second time and he himself reconnected the 
tube. In response to the nephew's question, the patient indicated she 
wanted the tube out of her throat and the IV disconnected . 
Patient Tried to Remove Tube 
One nurse stated that several times the patient attempted to remove the 
tube but her son told her not to. A second nurse, Mr. Heyse, stated that on 
one occasion the patient had put her hand to the tube and the son pulled 
the hand down, telling her the tube would have to be put back in because of 
hospital policy. Heyse reported a second exchange between the son and 
mother about removal of the tube and what the effect would be, with the 
same questions and answers as are within the above quote marks . 
After the first communication between mother and son, which was 
witnessed by Nurse Heyse as reported above, the son initially requested 
and then became adamant that the endotracheal tube should be removed. 
When the nurses resisted, he demanded that superiors be contacted . Upper 
level personnel became involved but relayed back to the patient's son that 
the final decision would be the treating doctor's decision, pursuant to 
hospital policy guidelines. 
During the later morning hours of Sunday, Nov. 9, 1986, Dr. Dorros 
had become aware of the patient's son's intent to implement his mother's 
desire to be removed from the respirator. Dorros arrived at the hospital 
room while the patient's son was absent. Dorros entered the room and 
discussed the patient's condition with the patient and her nephew, advising 
both that she was "salvageable" and not a terminal case, that she would 
have the cardiac catheterization on Monday, Nov. 10, and that he would 
not order the endotracheal tube removed. As Dr. Dorros was completing 
this discussion, the patient's son re-entered the room . Dr. Dorros stated 
that in the presence of the nephew, the patient, the patient's son and other 
hospital personnel he repeated the same information and refused to 
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remove the endotracheal tube. Dr. Dorros states that the patient was alert 
and responsive and believes she understood when he informed her of this. 
The son asked Dorros to step outside in the corridor so they could 
converse further. Dorros stated he told the son he would not pull the tube. 
The son told Dorros he understood Dorros's position and agreed with 
him. The son said that if it was his patient, he wouldn't pull the tube . The 
son explained that he and his mother didn't want any heroic measures 
taken to save her life. The son asked that she be a "No code" patient. The 
son went on to ask what would happen if the endotracheal tube came out 
- would it be reinserted? Dorros replied that it would not be reinserted if 
the patient was a "No code". Dorros characterized the family's feelings 
about the endotracheal tube as saying it was "cruel and unusual 
punishment". Dr. Dorros determined to enter a "No code 4" order; that is, 
under hospital guidelines, to "suspend the otherwise automatic initiation 
of cardiopulmonary resuscitation." Dr. Dorros then went to the nurse's 
station to enter the physician's order for "No code 4". 
St. Luke's Hospital guidelines for "Do Not Resuscitate Orders" provide 
that "A mentally competent adult has the legal right to accept or refuse any 
form of treatment and his / her wishes must be recognized and honored by 
the physician ." The guidelines further provide that "When the patient is 
competent, do not resuscitate (DNR) decisions will be reached 
consensually by the physician and the patient." Under the guideline, Dr. 
Dorros should have discussed this DNR order with the patient. However, 
the clear communications between the son and mother as witnessed and 
quoted by Nurse Heyse above, leave little doubt that the mother was 
supportive of the DNR order. Failure by Dr. Dorros to strictly abide by 
the guidelines, under these circumstances, constitutes no wrongdoing. 
View from Nurses' Station 
One of the nurses who had been present and had heard Dr. Dorros's 
discussion with the patient's son in the hospital room, went to the nurse's 
station to make appropriate notes. At the nurse's station, there is a 
television monitor covering the inside of the room in which the patient was 
being treated. Moments later, this nurse, upon looking up to the television 
monitor, states that he saw the son grab the hand of his mother, bring it to 
the endotracheal tube, wrap her fingers around the endotracheal tube, and 
motion to the mother to pull the tube out. Thereafter, the nurse observed 
the mother deliberately pull out the endotracheal tube. Immediately 
thereafter, the son started to hug his mother and began to stroke her hair. 
A nurse re-entered the room and asked if any help was needed and was 
advised in the negative. Later, a nurse would be advised by the patient's 
son that the endotracheal tube came out inadvertently. Under the "No code 
4" order, nothing was done and the patient died within a few minutes. 
Dr. Dorros was at the nurses' station writing the "No code" order when 
someone called his attention to the room monitor for the patient's room. 
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Dorros stated that he observed that the endotracheal tube was already out. 
Dorros said he was angry and frustrated and drove from the hospital to his 
home in Fox Point. He received a phone call from a nurse shortly 
thereafter and was told that the patient had died. 
The patient's nephew reconstructed the events somewhat differently. He 
stated that after the patient's son returned from his discussion with Dr. 
Dorros in the hallway, the patient's son untied his mother's hand. The 
nephew states that the mother then brought her hand up to her face , with 
the son's hand on hers . The nephew states that the patient felt along her 
cheek and then the son let go of her hand. Thereafter, according to the 
nephew, the patient grasped the endotracheal tube and pulled it out. The 
nephew said that the son hugged and kissed his mother, that she gasped for 
breath, and a minute or two later became unconscious . The nephew states 
that at no time did the patient indicate she wanted the tube reinserted. 
The son stated his mother was very rational , very adamant, and 
repetitive in expressing her desire to have the tube removed . In the face of 
this , he stated he agreed with her and pressed the nurses and supervisors to 
accomplish this. Delay ensued and he was distressed and angered by it. 
After the passage of a period of time , he left his mother's hospital room to 
make a phone call to his wife . When he returned, Dr. Dorros was there. 
The son stated that he heard only the tail end of Dr. Dorros's conversation 
with the nephew and that Dr. Dorros did not go over the same explanation 
for the son. The son stated that he and Dorros went out into the hallway. 
The son told Dorros that if he was in Dorros's shoes , he would not order 
the tube taken out. The son further indicated that he did not think that 
Dorros should be put in that position. The son stated he did ask Dorros if 
Dorros would reinsert the tube if it came out. Dorros said that he would 
not reinsert the tube. The son stated that immediately after this 
conversation in the hall, he, the son, went back to his mother's room and 
told her, "If you want the tube out, you'll have to take it out yourself." The 
son stated that without any hesitation , his mother grabbed the tube and 
pulled it out. The son stated he could not be sure whether he was or was not 
holding his mother's hand , but he is absolutely sure he did not touch the 
tube nor pull it out nor gesture for her to pull it out. The son stated he felt 
that his mother was a very devout Catholic and did not intend to take her 
own life by removing the tube, but merely wanted to end the extraordinary 
life support measures on which she was depending and that he felt sure she 
knew she was dying. The son indicated that he had never discussed the 
prospect of heart surgery with his mother and that he believed , given her 
condition on Sunday morning, that the mother was dying and that her 
condition was terminal. When asked in the investigation whether or not a 
physician should remove the tube, or whether he , the son, should remove 
the tube , the son replied definitely not. He indicated that if the mother 
could do it herself, then so be it. 
The investigation revealed no ill will between the son and his mother and 
discovered no evidence of malice on the part of the son. He appears 
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to have loved his mother. 
The above does not set forth all that transpired or all that was reported 
in the investigation. Some additional facts relevant to the legal questions 
are included below. 
Legal Comment 
The son, under any given version of the facts , could be convicted of 
assisting a suicide in violation of Wisconsin Statute 940. 12 only if the 
mother's death was a suicide. For a number of reasons set forth below, her 
death was not a suicide within the meaning of the law. 
Wisconsin statutory law does not affirmatively define suicide. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court has defined suicide, however, in Bisenius v. 
Karns. 42 Wis 2d 42( 1968) at 52 as "the voluntary and intentional taking of 
one's life by a sane person." Generally, the person committing suicide 
undertakes a self-destructive act of shooting, stabbing, or hanging oneself 
or injecting or ingesting a poisonous drug with the intent to kill oneself. 
In the instant case, no such self-destructive act was involved. At the 
heart of the matter, instead, is the patient's decision to refuse to continue 
the respirator treatment , a refusal she had a right under law to make. Such 
refusal followed by death does not constitute suicide. 
It is fundamentalla w that when treating a competent, conscious ad ult , a 
physician must secure consent of the patient before intruding upon the 
body in any fashion. The doctor who fails to secure such consent may be 
found liable in civil law for damages and may be charged under criminal 
law with battery. In SchloendorJJc. Society oj New York Hospital, 211 
N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), a case often cited for this principle , the 
court stated, "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a 
right to determine what shall be done with his body; and a surgeon who 
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault for 
which he is liable in damages." In Matter oj Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 
2d, 252, N. Y .S. 2d 705 (Supreme Court 1962), the competent adult patient , 
while authorizing a needed operation, refused to authorize a blood 
transfusion and the hospital superintendent claimed that this would 
constitute suicide. The court rejected that argument concluding that "it is 
the individual who is the subject of a medical decision who has the final say 
and that this must necessarily be so in a system of government which gives 
the greatest possible protection to the individual in the furtherance of his 
own desires." Similarly, in recent years, in most reported cases , courts have 
refused to order blood transfusions for competent adult Jehovah 
Witnesses who decline to accept such transfusions on religious grounds. 
An exception to this rule is found in Application oj President and 
Directors oj Georgetown College Inc., 331 F 2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), 
where the court ordered a blood transfusion over a young sick mother's 
objection in order to protect her life , holding that the state had a 
compelling interest in limiting the potential that her minor children would 
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become public charges. In Guardianship of Gertrude Raasch. Milwaukee 
County Court Case Number 455-996 (1972), the court refused to order a 
competent 77-year old woman to undergo surgery although the petitioning 
hospital administrator alleged that she would die within several days 
without it. St. Luke's Hospital's "Guidelines for the Removal of Patients 
from Ventilators" recognize this rule providing that "competent adult 
patients have the right to make the decision regarding their level of care 
regardless of the severity of their illness." Further, the hospital's guidelines 
for "Do Not Resuscitate Orders" provide that a "mentally competent adult 
has the legal right to accept or refuse any form of treatment and his / her 
wishes must be recognized and honored by the physician." 
Professor Robert Byrn, in an article often cited in cases on this issue 
entitled "Compulsory Life Saving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 
Fordham L. Rev. I" (1975) stated: 
(A) competent adult is free to reject lifesaving medical treatment unless some 
other compelling state interest overbalances his claim of right. It is as much an 
error to distort this freedom to include a right to commit suicide, as it is to 
condemn its exercise as an attempt at suicide. Rejection of lifesaving therapy and 
attempted suicide are. and should be. as different in la was the proverbial apples 
and oranges. 
This competent , conscious, and informed 78-year old patient had a right to 
reject the endotracheal tube and this did not constitute suicide. 
Element of Suicide is Desire 
Further, an element of suicide is the desire to kill oneself. The facts in 
this case do not reflect a desire on the part of this patient to die. Persons 
who knew her said she travelled widely, was basically happy, and loved 
life. She did not seek, invite , or wish for the heart damage which was the 
efficient cause of her death. She did lawfully desire to end the respirator 
treatment. Persons who knew her well, including a priest who had known 
the family for many years, are in agreement in interpreting her attitude in 
this matter as founded in acceptance of Divine Providence and basically 
being: 
I can 't and don't have to tolerate the tube in my condition. God's will be done . If I 
can live without the respirator. fine; but if not , then it is time for my eternal 
reward. 
These words , used by those who knew her , find a resonant ring in the case 
of Satz v. Perlmutter 362 so. 2d 160, 162-163 (Fla. App. 1978). There the 
court stated: 
As to suicide. the facts here unarguably reveal that Mr. Perlmutter would die, but 
for the respirator. The disconnecting of it, far from causing his unnatural death 
by means of a 'death prod ucing agent' in fact will merely result in his death , if at 
all, from natural causes ... The testimony of Mr. Perlmutter ... is that he really 
wants to live, but do so , God and Mother Nature willing, under his own power. 
This basic wish to live, plus the fact that he did not self-induce his horrible 
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affliction, precludes his further refusa l of treatment being classed as attempted 
suicide. 
Those who knew the 78-year old patient relate that she was a devout 
Catholic, a regular churchgoer who would abhor committing an act of 
suicide. In this regard , it should be noted that ethicists and moralists in 
classic terms have indicated that a person need not undergo extraordinary 
treatment to preserve his or her life. Whether treatment is ordinary or 
extraordinary is determined not from the perspective of the hospital where 
sophisticated and onerous invasive procedures are performed on a routine 
basis, but rather from the perspective of the patient. Was it extraordinary 
from the perspective of this 78-year old heart-damaged patient , who had 
been cardio-shocked several times in the recent past, to require her to 
continue to suffer the endotracheal tube and the respirator? To submit to 
cardiac catheterization? To heart surgery? As she was a Catholic and 
probably somewhat familiar with church teaching on that issue, it is worth 
noting that the "Declaration on Euthanasia" approved by Pope John 
Paul II (1980) states: 
It is also permissible to make do with the normal means that medicine can offer. 
Therefore one cannot impose on anyone the obligations to have recourse to a 
technique which is already in use but which carries a risk or is burdensome. Such 
a refusal is not the equivalent of suicide; on the contrary, it should be considered 
as an acceptance of the human condition, or a wish to avoid the application of a 
medical procedure disproportionate to the results that can be expected , or a 
desire not to impose excessive expense on the family or the community. 
At law, the death of this patient was not a suicide. Accordingly, 
whatever the son did , or did not do , such conduct could not constitute the 
crime of assisting in a suicide. 
Influence on Decision 
Our decision in this case is influenced by the fact that these events 
occurred in a hospital and that all disinterested persons corroborated the 
statement that the patient was conscious, competent and informed and 
wanted the endotracheal tube removed. 
Further, we note that as the patient was conscious , competent and 
informed , we are not dealing with "substituted judgment" such as is the 
situation with a minor or a person in a comatose or vegetative condition. 
Different considerations playa role in such cases. In addition, as the 
endotracheal tube and respirator are clearly medical treatments, we are 
not confronted with such questions as may be raised by hydration and 
nutrition. 
A physician or hospital personnel, in dealing with a competent, 
conscious adult patient , need not abide by every directive the patient has a 
right to give. If a patient opts to terminate a particular treatment and the 
physician and / or hospital personnel disagree, generally (under many 
circumstances) reasonable time ought be permitted for the patient to 
24 Linacre Quarterly 
change his mind or to secure another physician in order that the first 
doctor may withdraw and / or to permit the patient to transfer from the 
hospital to elsewhere. 
In reviewing this case, one may well feel events may better have moved 
more slowly and deliberately on Nov. 9, 1986, or taken an entirely different 
course. To their strong credit, many of the nurses and doctors at St. Luke's 
involved in this matter reflect an admirable and vigorous commitment to 
the principle that every effort, and with informed consent even bold and 
unique ones, are to be made to save and restore the lives of their patients. 
Understandably, they were keenly desirous of proceeding with recuperative 
efforts on behalf of the patient and were much distressed and greatly 
concerned by the events that transpired. The forthright candor of some of 
the personnel is to be much respected. 
This case has obviously caused great concern to the son of the deceased 
patient. It highlights the wisdom of the general counsel that physicians are 
well advised to leave the care of critically ill family members to other 
physicians. 
May, 1988 
E. Michael McCann 
District Attorney of 
Milwaukee County 
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